Bibliography


 * A Bibliography on** [|Modern Political Thought]**, occasionally updated. toc**

=Hobbes= Books and articles on Hobbes.

Lewis, Thomas J. 2003. Recognizing rights: Hobbes on the authority of mothers and conquerors. //Canadian Journal of Political Science// 36 (1):39-60. [|Link].


 * Abstract**. This article follows Hobbes’s distinction between man as the artificer of a commonwealth and man as the material of the commonwealth, by exploring the meaning of natural right and consent from the perspective of an artificer or potential sovereign. From this perspective, natural rights are transformed from alleged attributes of humans into decisions by a victor in war to treat the defeated as if they had natural rights. Similarly, consent is transformed from actions of subjects or citizens into a decision by a victor to recognize the defeated as if they had a right to consent and to treat them as if they had consented. Moreover, Hobbes’s concept of a commonwealth by institution is understood as a definitional standard for the creation of commonwealths by force or acquisition, rather than as a possible historical event. Hobbes sought to explain and substantiate this view of natural right and consent by comparing the emergence of political authority from victory in war to the emergence of authority of a mother over her infant in a state of nature. According to Hobbes, just as maternal authority rests on a mother’s recognition of the right of her infant to consent, political authority rests on the victor’s recognition of the right of the defeated to consent. The practical policy thrust of Hobbes’s thought emerges from his comparison of the authority of mothers and conquerors.


 * Comments**: A useful discussion of the notion of "consent" in Hobbes. Suggests that consent must be understood as an attitude the ruler takes towards the subjects, not so much as a specific action that the subjects take authorizing the ruler.

Ashcraft, Richard (1971). Hobbes's Natural Man: A Study in Ideology Formation. //Journal of Politics// 33 (4): pp. 1076-1117. [|Link].


 * Comments**. This article shows how Hobbes' use of the concept of the "state of nature" overturned the common presuppositions of political philosophy at the time //Leviathan// was published. It suggests that Hobbes managed to redefine what "natural" meant by drawing, among other things, on reports of native life in the Americas. Very clearly written.

Hampton, Jean (1999). The Failure of Hobbes's Social Contract Argument. Originally appeared in her book //[|Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition]// (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 189-190, 197-207. Reprinted in //[|The Social Contract Theorists: Critical Essays on Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau]// (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), pp. 41-57.


 * Comments**: This is part of a longer book, only lightly edited (the essay still has references to previous chapters of the [|book] from which it is taken). Hampton argues that Hobbes's argument contains a fallacy; she accepts the psychology that Hobbes describes, but suggests that on Hobbes's assumptions no one could agree to transfer all his or her rights to an absolute sovereign, since even in the state of civil society people must necessarily remain judges of what conduces to their own self-preservation.

Hampton, Jean (1986). //[|Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition]// (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).


 * Comments**: This book is a very careful reconstruction of Hobbes's argument using the tools of modern game theory. Hampton argues that Hobbes's argument, though powerful, is ultimately flawed - either inconsistent with his psychology or consistent with his psychology but unable to establish the necessity of an absolute sovereign. An excerpt from the book is reprinted in //[|The Social Contract Theorists: Critical Essays on Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau].//

Gauthier, David (1999). Hobbes's Social Contract. Originally appeared in //Nous// 22 (1988), pp. 71-82. Reprinted in //[|The Social Contract Theorists: Critical Essays on Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau]// (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), pp. 59-71. [|Link].


 * Comments**: Gauthier criticizes [|Hampton], arguing that she does not take seriously enough the idea of a social contract, and hence too quickly dismisses Hobbes's argument. Hampton replies [|here].

=Locke= Books and articles on Locke.

Cohen, Joshua (1986). [|Structure, Choice and Legitimacy: Locke's Theory of the State]. //Philosophy and Public Affairs// 15(4), pp. 301-324. [[|Link]].


 * Comments**: A somewhat difficult discussion of a relatively narrow question, namely, whether a state of formal inequality in political rights between the propertied and the propertiless (with the franchise restricted to those with property, the position Locke endorses in the Second Treatise) can be justified in Lockean terms. Answers in the affirmative. It has some lucid discussion of the meaning of equality in Locke as equal //jurisdiction// or //authority//, and some interesting reflections on the differences between Locke and Rousseau. For Locke the system of property is "natural" in ways in which it is not for Rousseau; hence for Rousseau it is a proper subject of deliberation.

Simmons, A. John (1989). [|Locke's State of Nature]. //Political Theory//, Vol. 17, No. 3. (Aug., 1989), pp. 449-470. [[|Link]].


 * Comments**: A useful discussion of the moral dimensions of the state of nature in Locke. Simmons argues both that a) the state of nature is always a relational concept in Locke and b) that the state of nature has no determinate "social" content, since its social content depends on how many people adhere to the law of nature. A different interpretation of the state of nature than the one given in class.

Tully, James (1983). Introduction. In Tully, ed. //A Letter Concerning Toleration//. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983). [[|Link]].


 * Comments**: Puts Locke's //Letter// in context, tracing the evolution of his views on toleration as the political climate for toleration in England changed. Suggests that Locke moved from a position relatively unfriendly to toleration to a rather radica position.

Bou-Habib, Paul (2003). [|Locke, Sincerity, and the Rationality of Persecution]. //Political Studies//, Vol. 51, n. 4 (December 2003), pp. 611-626. [[|Link]].


 * Abstract**: According to the most influential contemporary reading of John Locke's //Letter Concerning Toleration// (1689), his main argument against religious persecution is unsuccessful. That argument holds that coercion is ineffective as a means of instilling religious beliefs in its victims. I propose a different reading of the //Letter//. Locke's main consideration against persecution is not the unsuccessful belief-based argument just outlined, but what I call the //sincerity argument//. He believes that religious coercion is irrational because it is ineffective as a means of inculcating the right intentions in people. Once this alternative argument is placed at its centre, the //Letter// is seen to be a more fertile source of political argument than is suggested by alternative readings. In particular, the sincerity argument gives us a powerful reason for rejecting state moral paternalism, the doctrine that the state may use coercion to make people morally virtuous. If moral virtue depends upon people having the right intentions, and if coercion is ineffective as a means of instilling the right intentions in people, then state moral paternalism is ineffective and hence irrational.


 * Comments**: Tries to argue that Locke's argument for toleration is essentially valid and does not depend on special theological reasons. Rejects an influential reading of Locke's arguments for toleration.

Schwartzman, Micah (2005). [|The Relevance of Locke's Religious Arguments for Toleration]. //Political Theory//, Vol. 33, n. 5 (2005), pp. 678-705. [[|Link]].


 * Abstract**: John Locke’s theory of toleration has been criticized as having little relevance for politics today because it rests on controversial theological foundations. Although there have been some recent attempts to develop secular, or publicly accessible, arguments out of Locke’s writings, these tend to obscure and distort the religious arguments that Locke used to defend toleration. More importantly, these efforts ignore the role that religious arguments may play in supporting the development of a normative consensus on the legitimacy of liberal political principles. Bracketing the search for publicly accessible justifications makes it possible to appreciate the continued relevance of Locke’s religious arguments for toleration.

Lorenzo, David J. (2003). [|Tradition and Prudence in Locke's Exceptions to Toleration]. //American Journal of Political Science//, Vol. 47, n. 2 (April 2003), pp. 248-258. [[|Link]].


 * Abstract**: Why did Locke exclude Catholics and atheists from toleration? Not, I contend, because he was trapped by his context, but because his prudential approach and practical judgments led him to traditional texts. I make this argument first by outlining the connections among prudential exceptionality, practical judgments, and traditional texts. I then describe important continuities between conventional English understandings of the relationship between state and religion and Locke's writings on toleration, discuss Locke's conception of rights, and illustrate his use of prudential exceptions and distinctions. I conclude by arguing that Locke's problems are relevant to assessing contemporary liberal discussions of toleration and the separation of state and religion that lean heavily on practical justifications.


 * Comments**: A useful account of why Locke did not argue for toleration for Catholics and atheists, despite the fact that his principles would seem to show that they should be tolerated, and that other people around his time did argue for such toleration. Claims that the magistrate has broad authority to abridge rights based on traditional "experience" given Locke's understanding of the function of political power.

=Rousseau= Books and articles on Rousseau.

Gourevitch, Victor (1997). Introduction. In //[|Rousseau: The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings]//, pp. ix-xxi. //Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought// (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).


 * Comments**: A very useful short introduction to Rousseau's early political theory, with a focus on the //Second Discourse//.

Riley, Patrick (1970). [|A Possible Explanation of Rousseau's General Will]. //American Political Science Review// 64(1): 86-97. [[|Link]].


 * Comments**: Argues that there is a contradiction at the heart of Rousseau's political theory between his emphasis on will - on the voluntary consent of individuals to the political order - and his ideal of a wholly socialized existence modeled on the ancient //polis//.

Ripstein, Arthur (1992). The General Will. //History of Philosophy Quarterly// 9(1), pp. 51-62.


 * Comments**: In contrast to [|Riley], argues that the general will in Rousseau is a coherent notion, understandable as a "we-intention" analogous in important respects to certain linguistic phenomena.

Diamond, Jared. (1987). [|The Worst Mistake in the History of the Human Race]. //Discover// Magazine, May 1987, pp. 64-66. [[|Link]].


 * Comments**: Not really about Rousseau, but an interesting argument for the view that hunter-gatherers in societies like the ones Rousseau seems to prefer in the //Second Discourse// really did live better lives than most people in the world today.

=Mill= Books and articles on Mill

Jacobson, Daniel. 2000. [|Mill on Liberty, Speech, and the Free Society]. //Philosophy & Public Affairs// 29 (3):276-309. [[|Link]]

Anderson, Elizabeth S. (1991). [|John Stuart Mill and Experiments in Living]. //Ethics//, Vol. 102, No. 1. (Oct., 1991), pp. 4-26. [[|Link]]

=Tocqueville= Books and articles on Tocqueville

Mansfield, Harvey and Winthrop, Deborah. 2000. Introduction to the University of Chicago Press edition of [|Democracy in America].


 * Comments**: A good introduction to the Democracy in America. Provides information on the life of Tocqueville, his intellectual context, and the similarities and differences between his thought and that of other important thinkers (such as Rousseau, Montesquieu, Locke, Hobbes, and Aristotle). Also gives a clear overview of this massive work; i's especially good on the significance of "pride" in Tocqueville. Written from a [|Straussian] perspective, it's sometimes a bit too breathless about Tocqueville's significance: the introduction calls Democracy in America "the best book written about America" and "the best book written about democracy." For a more critical appreciation of Tocqeuville, this Gordon Wood [|review] of Mansfield and Winthrop's edition of Democracy in America in the //New York Review of Books// (unfortunately not free, but cheap) is useful.

=Wollstonecraft= Books and articles on Wollstonecraft

Abbey, Ruth. 1999. [|Back to the Future: Marriage as Friendship in the Thought of Mary Wollstonecraft]. //Hypatia// vol. 14, n. 3, pp. 78-95. [[|Link]].


 * Abstract**: If liberal theory is to move forward, it must take the political nature of family relations seriously. The beginnings of such a liberalism appear in Mary Wollstonecraft's work. Wollstonecraft's depiction of the family as a fundamentally political institution extends liberal values into the private sphere by promoting the ideal of marriage as friendship. However, while her model of marriage diminishes arbitrary power in family relations, she seems unable to incorporate enduring sexual relations between married partners.